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http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~sskaperd/The ￿rst principle of economics is that every
agent is actuated only by self-interest. The work-
ings of this principle may be viewed under two
aspects, according as the agent acts without or
with, the consent of others a⁄ected by his ac-
tions. In wide senses, the ￿rst species of action
may be called war; the second, contract.
Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics, 1881 (pp.16,17)
"[T]he e⁄orts of men are utilized in two di⁄erent
ways: they are directed to the production or
transformation of economic goods, or else to
appropriation of goods produced by others.
Vilfredo Pareto, Manual of Political Economy, 1906 [1972,
p. 341]Self-interest and its dark side
￿ production vs infuence
￿ managers feathering their nests
￿ lobbying and rent-seeking
￿ stealing
￿ arming and ￿ghting
￿ organized crime
Production vs Appropriation"Economics" out of "political economy"
Ceding areas of research to other disciplines (e.g., Inter-
national Political Economy)
First (known) attempt at modeling before Jack:
Haavelmo, T. (1954), A Theory of Economic Evolution,
North-Holland.Main points:
￿ Con￿ict and its costs are economically very impor-
tant
￿ Con￿ict and appropriation follow directly from the
assumption of self-interest
￿ Modeling appropriation leads to very di⁄erent ￿nd-
ings and interpretations of reality
￿ First-best world not empirically plausible.
￿ Controlling and Governing con￿ict and appropriation
are also important economic activities.
￿ For-pro￿t governance dominant in history, but part
of the problem.￿ Modern Governance as a partial solution to the dark
side of self-interest1. The economic relevance of insecurity and con￿ict
2. On the received approach
3. Modifying the received model
4. Trade and con￿ict I: merchants and warriors
5. Trade and con￿ict II: competing for resources
6. Proprietary Governance: Autocracy and orga-
nized anarchy
7. Modern governance
8. Concluding RemarksThe economic relevance of insecurity and con-
￿ict
Since WWII:
￿ Civil wars in 73 countries with over 16 million deaths
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003)
￿ Large other direct economic costs (arming, destruc-
tion, underutilization of resources; Collier et. al.,
2003)
￿ Other welfare costs of con￿ict (Hess, 2003)￿ Distributional and Social con￿ict (strikes and lock-
outs, protests, military coups, ethnic, religious, or
class rivalries, common crime)
￿ Absence of property rights (e.g., land) and its costsTransnational Insecurity
Anarchy in international relations
Fewer interstate wars (and economic costs) since WWII
But, there was a Cold WAR (with costs)
Two current and future concerns:
￿ Resource contestation (Oil: Central Asia, South China
Sea; Water: Nile, Middle East, South Asia) (Klare,
2001)
￿ Future "peer competitor" to US?
Costs of Con￿ict and Appropriation overwhelm costs of
many other distortions.On the Received Approach
Robinson (R) and Xena (X)
Two material goods: ￿sh (f) and coconuts (c)
Robinson￿ s endowment eR converted one-for-one into ￿sh
Xena￿ s endowment eX one-for-one into coconuts
Utility function, U(fi;ci); linearly homogeneous.
Edgeworth￿ s (1881) formulation
Problem of exchange between the likes of Robinson and
Xena.What is the most reasonable process by which the two
sides will arrive at an exchange of some of Robinson￿ s
￿sh for some of Xena￿ s coconuts?
What determines these exchange ratios or prices?
Are there conditions under which prices will be close to
those that would prevail under perfect competition?
Strong tendency
Goods that are more valued have higher prices
Those who hold more valued goods receive higher
incomes and utility.
Under competitive pricing
Robinson￿ s equilibrium utility: eR
@U(eR;eX)
@f






@cMajor Caveat: What if coconuts are used as weapons?
Instead of cooperative, relationship is adversarialModifying the received model:
Robinson Versus Xena
eR = f + gR
eX = c + gX
gi (i = R;X) : ￿Guns￿
Quantities of ￿sh and coconuts now variable
￿Total utility￿: U(f;c) = U(eR ￿ gR;eX ￿ gX)
Guns used to determine distributionV R(gR;gX) = p(gR;gX)U(eR ￿ gR;eX ￿ gX)





U(eR ￿ gR;eX ￿ gX)
[Marginal Bene￿t of guns]
￿p(gR;gX)
@U(eR ￿ gR;eX ￿ gX)
@f
[Opportunity cost of guns]
Unique Nash equilibrium (g￿
R;g￿

















-More productive get less
-Peasants have been receiving less compensation than
specialists in violence (lords, kings, ma￿osi)
-Dynamic consequences of distribution
(incentives for innovation and investment; Baumol, 1990,
Gonzalez, 2005).
-What about in￿uence activities in organizations? (Mil-
grom and Roberts)
-Re: Identifying wages as proportional to marginal pro-
ductivity in empirical studies.Trade and Con￿ict I: Warriors and Traders
What if one could opt out of insecure trade?
-By consuming their endowment
-By producing something of less value, taking more
leisure, going to the "woods"
(Suppose the former)











X) ￿ U(0;eX)￿ Enforcement costs can foreclose exchange
￿ The more e⁄ective appropriation is, the more likely
autarky is.
￿ The more productive side has more of an incentive
to refrain from exchange
￿ Complementarity between trading and ￿ghting (Vikings,
Russians, Genovese, Venetians, English and Dutch
East India Companies, Admiral Ho￿ s expeditions)
￿ Home-market biasTrade and Con￿ict II: Competing for a Resource
-Insecure resource ("oil")
-Groups contest with "guns"
-Guns vs. Butter
-Valued: Oil and Butter
-"small" country￿ Insecurity shifts welfare down
￿ The higher the insecurity, the lower is insecurity.
￿ Countries importing oil gain unambiguously.
￿ Exporters of oil lose as long as its price is not too
high.
￿ Tendency to over-export oil
[Reversal of comparative advantage relative to the ab-
sence of con￿ict (over a certain price range)]
￿ Price range over which increasing international price
of oil associated with reduction in welfare (natural
resource curse)Two ways out of Anarchy (in Jack￿ s words):
￿ Hobbesian (or, vertical) contract
￿ Lockean (or, horizontal) contractProprietary Governance:
Hierarchies, Kings, and Lords
Emergence of a ￿vertical￿contract.
If those who control the means of violence can pacify
their territories, what prevents them from taking away
whatever they can from their subjects?
Or, Who is going to guard the guardians?Monopolistic Autocracy
The ￿stationary bandit￿ in Olson (1991) and McGuire
and Olson (1996)
-Technological advantage in the provision of collec-
tive protection and security.
-Higher security can induce more investment in in-
frastructural public goods and expanded trade.
-ruler could lower tribute so that he can stimulate
these economic forces further.
Necessary condition: A high degree of certainty that
he will be around in the future to reap the rewards of
such policies.Internal and external challenges reduce horizon
Rulers have much higher extractive powers than simple
bandits or robbers have. (Marcouiller and Young, 1995;
Moselle and Polak, 2001.)
Long horizon is by no means su¢ cient for following growth-
promoting policies (Robinson,1997)
-Promoting trade implies that merchants becomes richer
and perhaps ask for more rights and a share of power;
-Expanding education can make more of the population
become conscious of its subservient status and demand
reforms and a change in the status quo;
-Even building roads can make it easier for rebels to reach
the capital and drive out the ruler.President of Zaire Mobuto Sese Seko to President Juvenal
Habyarintha of Rwanda:
￿I told you not to build any roads... Bulding roads never
did any good.. I￿ ve been in power in Zaire for thirty years
and I never built one road. Now they are driving down
them to get you.￿
Evidence on regimes with dynastic pretensions
Spain, Russia, France
What about competition among such states (e.g., North
and Thomas, 1973)?Competing Autocracies
The received argument: Rulers will o⁄er lower taxes and
a higher service level, the more rulers there are around.
Necessary conditions:
1. Low mobility costs
2. Ability to commit on the part of the rulerAnother type of competition:
Fighting for turf (like those of ma￿osi and warlords)
This type of competition has very di⁄erent e⁄ects: The
more competition, the worse things get.
Autocratic rulers, left by themselves, ￿nd more pro￿table
to just ￿ght one another for territory and the tributary
subjects that come with it.
Competition from city-states brings is di⁄erent (Tilly, 1992)
Autocratic governance does not solve the problem of ap-
propriation.
It only brings to a higher, more organized, level.Restraints in Modern Governance







professional infrastructure (lawyers, judges, engineers,
civil servants)every step needs to be close to 100% free of ￿cor-
ruption.￿
close to 100% beliefs that no radical change will
occur in any of the above.Representation, Checks and Balances
17th century England and the transfer of con￿icts from
the battele￿eld to the political and judicial arenas (North
and Weingast, 1989); the King versus the nobles.
The podesta in 12th century Genoa (Greif, 1998)
Ceding power in exchange for peace
Land reform as a response to con￿ict and banditry (Horowitz,
1993, Grossman, 1994)
Employment subsidies (Zak, 1995, Grossman, 1995)
Generically, voluntary ex ante transfers to alleviate con-
￿ict (Rajan and Zingales, 2000)
Transition in South Africa (Rosendor⁄,1998)
Extension of the franchise as a commitment device (Ace-
moglu and Robinson, 2000)Bureaucracy
The US civil service in mid-19th century
Limits to discretion
Low-powered incentives
Limitations on in￿uence activities (Milgrom, 1988) and
Milgrom and Roberts,1990)
Rent-seeking possibly reduced in hierarchies (Warneryd,1998)
Bureaucracy and corporate governance
Real alternatives to bureaucracy: Arbitrary, amateur, and
corrupt political control of the levers of government; war-
lordism; organized crime.Concluding Remarks
￿ Con￿ict and appropriation costly activities
￿ Payo⁄s and productivity
￿ Appropriation and the foreclosure of exchange
￿ Competing for resources and the natural resource
curse
￿ Controlling appropriation, or Governance, is very costly.
￿ Highly paid managers, accountants, lawyers, and less
well-paid regulators and secretaries are all involved
in the business of engaging in or controlling the dark
side of self-interest. So are policemen, gangbangers,
ma￿osi, judges, spies, diplomats, and army generals.￿ Yet in modeling, empirical research, and policymak-
ing, the dominant worldview is that of a ￿rst-best
model, in which all these are costless.Some areas for research:
￿ Competing for resources and economic growth
￿ Should you trade with your probable competitor?
￿ Con￿ict management as investment
￿ What is modern governance about?
￿ What do hierarchies and bureaucracies do?Some related publications of Jack:
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￿ict, in K. Hartley and T. Sandler, eds., Hand-
book of Defense Economics, Vol.1, 165-189 (New
York: Elsevier).Hirshleifer, J. (2000), The macrotechnology of
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Durham, Y, J Hirshleifer, VL Smith, (1998), Do
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108(1-2), 169-195.Sidebar: Technologies of Con￿ict and Power
￿ The way inputs to insecurity and con￿ict are com-
bined is not cooperative, but adversarial.
￿ Production functions inappropriate way of combining
inputs
￿ Contest success functions as technologies of con￿ict




where f(￿) positive and increasing




where ai > 0




a0 + a1f(x1) + a2f(x2)
, ao > 0Justi￿cations and Derivations of Technologies of Con￿ict
and Power:
￿ Axiomatic (Independence from third-party e⁄ort key
axiom)
￿ Stochastic (f(x) = ekx derived from extreme value
distribution when error term is additive; f(x) = xm
derived from exponentional distribution when error
term is multiplicative; MacFadden, 1975; Jia, 2005)
￿ Quasi-Bayesian (contestant trying to persuade audi-
ence; Skaperdas and Vaidya, 2005; appropriate for
rent-seeking and in￿uence activities)Another functional form from the latter-approach




+ ￿[h(x1) ￿ h(x2)]
h(￿) is positive and increasing; ￿ > 0 (and further con-
strained)
Asymmetric form:
p1(x1;x2) = ￿ + ￿[h(x1) ￿ h(x2)] + Ah(x1)h(x2)
￿ 2 (0;1); A can be positive or negative but constrained